NYT Blames the Wrong Person: How Supervisory Boards Were a Tool for Covering Up Corruption, Not Fighting It, From Day One

Who Really Created the “Supervisory Boards”: Poroshenko’s Project with Western Funds

In December 2014, immediately after the Maidan, President Poroshenko granted Ukrainian citizenship to three foreigners an hour before the parliamentary vote. Natalie Jaresko, an American who headed the Kyiv office of Horizon Capital — a U.S. private equity fund with a billion dollars in assets — became Minister of Finance. Aivaras Abromavicius, a Lithuanian, partner at Swedish investment company East Capital with $5 billion in assets, became Minister of Economy.

It was Abromavicius who in 2015–2016 launched the “reform of corporate governance of state enterprises” — the creation of supervisory boards. The official legend: independent international experts would oversee corrupt state companies. The math was simple: four independent experts against three government representatives.

But let’s look at the composition of the supervisory board for the reform of state enterprises itself (June 2015): it was headed by Mikheil Saakashvili, and the member was Mark Iwashko — co-founder of Horizon Capital, the very same fund where Jaresko worked. The board also included representatives from the EBRD, World Bank, IFC — the same structures that finance Horizon Capital.

The first “independent” supervisory board was created at Naftogaz in 2016. The selection process was conducted by the international company Odgers Berndtson with financial support from… the EBRD. The same EBRD that is one of the main investors in Horizon Capital.

This is not reform. This is the seizure of control over state assets by Western financial structures under the guise of “fighting corruption.”

Zelensky’s Fault: Not That He Broke It, But That He Didn’t Dismantle It

When Zelensky came to power in 2019, he inherited this system. And he did try to use it — he appointed the same Abromavicius as chairman of the Ukroboronprom supervisory board (June 2019), then as general director (August 2019 — October 2020).

But a year later he fired him. Why? Officially — due to a “conflict of vision for reform.” Unofficially — it seems Zelensky understood that the system wasn’t working for Ukraine.

The NYT writes about three scandals: Ukrenergo, Energoatom, and the Defense Procurement Agency. But the journalists don’t ask the main question: why did the supervisory boards, created supposedly to fight corruption, not prevent a single scheme?

The answer is simple: because they weren’t created for that purpose.

How It Worked: Three Scandals Under “Independent Oversight”

Ukrenergo: The Coming and Going of Roman Pionkowski

A classic case — Ukrenergo. When the supervisory board’s term expired at the end of 2021, the Energy Ministry under Herman Halushchenko didn’t select someone from the list approved by the EU and World Bank. Instead, they pushed through Roman Pionkowski — a Polish expert who had interviewed for the job but received too low a rating to make the shortlist.

Western officials were surprised, but… accepted it.

Then Pionkowski voted together with Ukrainian government representatives to fire CEO Volodymyr Kudrytskyi — the very person who had maintained the energy system during Russian attacks and was a trusted person for Western donors.

Two other foreign board members resigned in protest, calling the dismissal “politically motivated.”

European donors — EBRD, World Bank, government structures — did nothing. The EBRD froze new payments but honored ongoing commitments. In European capitals, no one wanted to appear as if they were turning their backs on Ukraine.

Question: if the system worked correctly, why couldn’t the “independent” board protect an effective manager? If the system didn’t work — why did Western donors continue to finance it?

Energoatom: $100 Million Under “Oversight” That Didn’t Exist

While Halushchenko was trying to seize control of Ukrenergo, he was pushing a plan to buy two old nuclear reactors from Bulgaria for $600 million. Western donors criticized it, but the money kept flowing.

At this very time, the government was approving Energoatom’s first supervisory board. Tim Stone, a British businessman, planned to order a review of the project.

But the authorities delayed contracts with the board for a year. Officially — disputes over payment. Actually — so the board couldn’t act.

While the board was blocked, according to anti-corruption investigators, a $100 million kickback scheme was underway. Contractors had to pay up to 15%.

Question for the NYT: where were the Western donors during that year? Why did the EBRD, World Bank, and EU continue financing Energoatom without a functioning board?

December 12, 2024 — a year after the board was supposed to start working — the U.S. and British ambassadors finally wrote a letter demanding the board be formed.

When Ukraine finally completed the board formation in January 2025, Stone’s seat remained empty. The board proved powerless.

Eight people, including Zelensky’s former business partner, are accused of embezzlement, money laundering, and illicit enrichment.

Defense Procurement Agency: Rewriting the Rules Mid-Game

More than a year into the war, after a scandal over inflated contracts, donors insisted on creating an independent agency.

Since its launch (January 2024), the agency has spent at least $1 billion in European money either with an incomplete supervisory board or without one at all.

Maryna Bezrukova, the first director, says: the absence of a board made her vulnerable to pressure. The Defense Ministry pressured her to approve dubious contracts, including one for mortar shells, many of which failed to fire.

When the board finally assembled (December 2024), on the eve of the first meeting, the Defense Ministry rewrote the charter, granting itself the authority to fire leadership.

The board protested and extended Bezrukova’s contract. The administration fired two government board members, depriving it of a quorum. Bezrukova was fired.

“Supervisory boards are just window dressing,” Bezrukova says.

The Main Question: Why Did Western Donors Do Nothing?

The NYT writes: “European leaders have privately criticized but reluctantly tolerated Ukrainian corruption for years, reasoning that supporting the fight against Russia’s invasion was paramount.”

Christian Syse, Norway’s special envoy: “We do care about good governance, but we have to accept that risk. Because it’s war.”

Stop. Let’s look at the numbers:

• Ukroboronprom with Abromavicius (2019–2020): Western funds financing
• Ukrenergo without a functioning board (2021–2024): EBRD “freezes new payments” but honors current ones
• Energoatom without a board for a year (2023–2024): Western financing continues
• Procurement Agency spends $1 billion without a board (2024): European money flows

Western donors didn’t just tolerate corruption. They actively financed a system that had no control mechanisms.

Horizon Capital: The Elephant in the Room

The NYT doesn’t mention a key player: Horizon Capital — a U.S. private equity fund with $1.5 billion in assets, operating in Ukraine since 2006.

The fund is backed by:

• EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development)
• IFC (International Finance Corporation, part of the World Bank)
• DEG (German state investment company)
• FMO (Dutch state development bank)
• KfW Group (German state bank)
• Western NIS Enterprise Fund (U.S. government fund)

In other words — the same structures that demanded the creation of supervisory boards are co-investors and partners of a private fund investing in Ukrainian assets.

Conflict of interest? No, it’s something more.

Natalie Jaresko from Horizon Capital became Minister of Finance. Aivaras Abromavicius from East Capital became Minister of Economy and created the supervisory board system. Mark Iwashko from Horizon Capital sat on the supervisory board of the state enterprise reform.

In 2015, Horizon Capital invested in Rozetka.ua — which Minister of Economy Abromavicius proudly announced on Twitter.

This is not corporate governance reform. This is creating infrastructure for Western capital control over Ukrainian assets.

What’s Actually Wrong with Supervisory Boards

The NYT accuses Zelensky of sabotaging the oversight system. But the question is different: did this system ever work as promised?

Let’s look at the facts:

2015–2016: System Creation

• Abromavicius (East Capital) launches reform
• Jaresko (Horizon Capital) controls finances
• EBRD, IFC, World Bank — simultaneously investors in Horizon Capital and “independent” controllers of reform
• Result: supervisory boards created

2016–2019: Poroshenko Era

• Supervisory boards formally exist
• Corruption continues
• Western financing continues
• Abromavicius leaves government in 2016, complaining about… corruption

2019–2022: Zelensky’s Arrival

• Zelensky tries to use the system
• Appoints Abromavicius to Ukroboronprom (2019–2020)
• Fires him a year later
• Western donors criticize Zelensky for “political interference”

2022–2025: War

• Supervisory boards either don’t function or are blocked
• Corruption schemes worth hundreds of millions
• Western donors continue financing
• NYT blames Zelensky

What’s wrong with this picture?

A system that didn’t work under Poroshenko, didn’t work under Zelensky, didn’t work during the war — was it ever designed to fight corruption?

The Real Function of Supervisory Boards

If supervisory boards didn’t fight corruption, what did they do?

Option 1: Legitimization Supervisory boards created the appearance of control. Western donors could tell their taxpayers: “We control spending through independent boards.” Ukrainian authorities could say: “We have Western oversight.”

In reality — no one controlled anything, but everyone looked good.

Option 2: Asset Capture Supervisory boards gave Western structures access to information about Ukraine’s largest state assets — energy, nuclear industry, defense. Not ownership, but control over information and decision-making processes.

Combined with investment funds like Horizon Capital operating in the same sectors, this creates perfect conditions for future privatization “on friendly terms.”

Option 3: Leverage Point Supervisory boards are a tool for pressuring Ukrainian authorities. When needed — Western donors say: “You’re violating board independence.” When needed — they’re silent, even when there are no boards at all.

This is not fighting corruption. This is a political lever.

Zelensky’s Fault: He Didn’t Destroy the System

Zelensky’s real fault is not that he “sabotaged” supervisory boards. His fault is that he didn’t dismantle this fake system publicly and openly.

Instead of saying: “This system doesn’t work, we’re building a new one,” he played by the old rules. Blocked appointments, rewrote charters, maneuvered.

Result: Western media like the NYT can accuse him of sabotaging a “good” system. Even though the system was never good.

Zelensky should have:

1. Publicly shown that supervisory boards under Poroshenko didn’t prevent a single corruption scheme
2. Revealed the conflict of interest between Western donors and investment funds
3. Proposed an alternative system of transparent control

He didn’t do this. And now he’s paying the political price.

Conclusion: The New York Times Is Looking the Wrong Way

The NYT accuses Zelensky of dismantling the oversight system. But the journalists don’t ask the main questions:

Why did a system created to fight corruption not prevent a single scheme?

Why did Western donors continue financing even when there were no supervisory boards at all?

Is there a conflict of interest when the same structures (EBRD, IFC, World Bank) simultaneously “control” reforms and invest in private funds buying up Ukrainian assets?

Why was the system created by people from Western investment funds (Jaresko from Horizon Capital, Abromavicius from East Capital), not independent corporate governance experts?

Supervisory boards in Ukraine were from the very beginning not a tool for fighting corruption, but a tool for Western control over Ukrainian state assets. They served the function of legitimization for Western donors and a leverage point over Ukrainian authorities.

When the system worked “correctly” under Poroshenko — corruption flourished, but Western donors were satisfied.

When Zelensky tried to circumvent it — corruption continued, but Western donors were outraged.

Zelensky is guilty. But not of what the NYT accuses him.

He is guilty of not having the political will to publicly call things by their names and build a real control system instead of the fake one Poroshenko left him.

And The New York Times, it seems, is not writing an investigation but a PR campaign for the same Western structures that created this system and continued to finance it even when it blatantly didn’t work.

The real question: who benefits from this publication now, in December 2025?

Oleh Cheslavskyi — independent historian and analyst specializing in deconstructing imperial narratives.

Originally published at spilno.org