Turkish NPP: How to Turn $33 Billion into Smoke

To understand the scale: $9 billion equals two full annual budgets of Yakutia. Two years of life for an entire region with roads, hospitals, schools, and civil servant salaries. But the money isn't going there. It's going to Turkey, into a project promised to launch in 2023, and now it's late 2025, and the plant still doesn't work.

Anatomy of Financial Failure

Let's break down the numbers. They're revealing.

2010. Signing of the intergovernmental agreement. Declared project cost — $20 billion. Russia takes on financing, construction, ownership, and operation under a build-own-operate scheme. Turkey pays nothing. In return, it promises to buy 50% of electricity for 15 years at a fixed price of 12.35 cents per kilowatt-hour.

2023. Cost already at $23-24 billion. They promise to launch the plant. They don't.

June 2024. Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev names a new figure — $24-25 billion.

December 2025. Another $9 billion in new financing. Plus $2 billion frozen abroad due to sanctions — never recovered.

Total: minimum $33-35 billion already invested or promised. And this isn't the end, because the plant still doesn't work.

For comparison: similar NPPs with 4800 MW capacity cost $20-24 billion worldwide. Russia has already spent $10-15 billion above the norm. Cost overrun exceeding 50%.

Belarus got an NPP with 2400 MW for $10 billion. Bangladesh — for $11.4 billion. The Chinese in Kazakhstan offer to build 2400 MW for $5.6 billion. Yet Russia is investing almost three times more money in a Turkish plant with twice the capacity.

Economics of Losses in Action

Now let's calculate payback. The plant should generate 35 billion kilowatt-hours per year. Turkey committed to buying 50% — that's 17.5 billion kWh at a price of 12.35 cents.

17.5 billion kWh × $0.1235 = $2.16 billion per year.

With a project cost of $33 billion, simple payback is 15.3 years. But that's in an ideal world where:

• The plant reaches full capacity immediately
• Turkey actually buys all promised 50%
• There are no additional expenses
• Operating costs aren't factored in

Reality is worse. The price of $0.1235 per kWh is fixed for 25 years without accounting for dollar inflation. This is catastrophically low. Kazakhstan discusses 4-4.5 cents for nuclear energy, but for the domestic market with subsidies. Slovenia calculates payback at a price of 75 euros per megawatt-hour (7.5 cents per kWh), and even this is considered the profitability threshold.

Turkey gets electricity at below cost. Effectively — free. And Russia pays for Turkey to agree to take this electricity.

Project's Real State

But payback figures are theory. Practice is much grimmer.

July 2025. Mass protests begin at the NPP construction site. Russian workers haven't been paid since May. Two months of delays. Personnel shrinks from 35,000 people to 12,000, then to 3,000. Ten thousand Russian workers return home — there's nothing to pay them with.

Those who remain work under threats. Turkish workers strike — their Russian colleagues fear joining because they're threatened with dismissal without paid return tickets.

Rosatom explains salary delays as "blocking of substantial funds due to third-party influence." Translating to human language: money is frozen by sanctions, there's nothing to pay with.

Simultaneously, it emerges that Rosatom is seeking investors to sell a 49% stake in the project. Desperately seeking. Because there's nothing to continue financing with. About $7 billion is missing to complete the work.

German company Siemens refused to supply critical equipment due to sanctions. Had to urgently order from China. Deadlines missed. Launch postponed from 2023 to 2024, from 2024 to 2025, now they promise 2026. But promises are worthless now.

Sanctions Evasion Schemes

In 2022, Russia tried to use the Akkuyu project to create an "offshore dollar reserve" — a sanctions evasion scheme. High-ranking officials participated in building the scheme, including Central Bank Chair Elvira Nabiullina.

The plan was: Gazprombank secretly receives about $9 billion from the Central Bank, then allegedly provides it as a loan for NPP construction, and the money is transferred through US banks to accounts at Turkey's largest state bank "Ziraat." From there, Russian companies could cash out dollars, bypassing sanctions.

The scheme didn't work. But it shows the main point: the project was initially viewed not as an economically viable investment, but as a tool for withdrawing and cashing out money.

In February 2025, Russia proposed a new scheme to Turkey: pay for NPP construction through Turkey's payments for Russian gas. Rosatom transfers rubles to Gazprom, which deducts the equivalent amount from Turkish payments. Essentially — barter. But even this didn't solve the problem.

Who Benefits

With a project cost of $33 billion and constantly growing expenses, the question arises: where exactly does the money go?

According to the official version — to building four power units of 1200 MW each. In reality — through an endless chain of contractors, subcontractors, consultants, and intermediaries.

Up to 40% of work is performed by Turkish companies. They receive Russian money for work on their territory. Turkish students study for free at Russian universities to work at the plant — at Russian budget expense. Turkey hasn't built a single power transmission line to connect the plant — Russia must do this too.

Turkey gets the plant practically free, cheap electricity, jobs, trained specialists, and no obligations. If the project fails — Russia's problem. If it succeeds — Turkey's gain.

And those in Russia who decide on allocating the next billions get their share. From Turkish partners. From Russian contractors. From all links in the chain that turns budget money into private fortunes.

When the project grows from $20 to $35 billion, when deadlines slip year after year, when "unforeseen expenses" and "technical difficulties" appear — each new billion passes through the hands of those who know how to profit from this.

Systemic Nature

Akkuyu NPP is not an exception but the rule. Look at African debt forgiveness. At "humanitarian aid" to friendly regimes. At infrastructure project financing in Central Asia. At loans to fraternal peoples.

Everywhere the same scheme. Money goes under plausible pretexts: strategic partnership, strengthening international positions, geopolitical influence. Not meant to return. But kickbacks return — to the pockets of those making the decisions.

While residents of Russian regions live with crumbling infrastructure, their taxes turn into Turkish nuclear plants that don't work, and into accounts in offshore banks of those financing these plants.

Nine billion dollars isn't just a figure in the budget. It's two Yakutias. It's hundreds of modern hospitals. It's thousands of kilometers of roads. It's education modernization in dozens of regions.

But they go to Turkey. To a country that shot down Russian planes, supports Moscow's opponents in Syria, plays its own game with NATO. To a country that openly uses Russia as a source of cheap money, giving nothing in return.

The economics of losses works flawlessly. For some — losses. For others — billion-dollar profits. And no accountability.