15 June, 19:14
In the recent escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran, an unexpected loser has emerged—not Tehran, and not even Hezbollah, but Moscow.
While the Israeli military dismantled key Iranian assets with impunity, the Kremlin’s reaction was deafening silence. This silence speaks volumes. The Israeli campaign did not merely undermine Iran’s deterrent capacity—it exposed the hollowness of Russia’s alliances and its impotence as a global security actor.
For years, Russia has positioned itself as a counterbalance to U.S. hegemony and a protector of anti-Western regimes. Its partnership with Iran was meant to symbolize a multipolar world order. But when that partnership was put to the test, Moscow vanished from the scene. In doing so, it inadvertently sent a clear message to its allies: Russia is a consumer of support, not a provider of protection.
The Mirage of Multipolarity
In theory, the Iran–Russia partnership serves mutual interests. Tehran supplies Moscow with drones, munitions, and military expertise, especially crucial for the war in Ukraine. Russia, in turn, offers diplomatic cover in international forums and shares intelligence in Middle Eastern theaters. Yet this exchange is starkly asymmetrical. When Iranian facilities in Isfahan were struck by Israeli missiles in April 2024, Russia issued no condemnation, took no retaliatory action, and merely recycled vague offers to “mediate” the crisis—offers neither side took seriously.
China, by contrast, sent observers to the region and called publicly for de-escalation, underscoring Beijing’s growing ability to balance visibility and caution. Even that modest step outshined Russia’s empty posture. As Reuters and Al Jazeera documented, Israel continued precision strikes in Syria throughout 2024 without fear of Russian interference or reprisal.
In practice, Russia’s behavior betrayed a stark reality: its so-called allies are geopolitical clients, and its partnerships are transactional rather than strategic. Iran donates blood and drones; Russia offers platitudes.
Iran, Alone
The Islamic Republic's diplomatic isolation has become impossible to ignore. Despite formal accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and repeated affirmations of strategic partnership from Moscow and Beijing, when Israeli jets flew, Iran stood alone. The UN Security Council remained inert; China stayed on the sidelines. And Russia, Tehran’s supposed partner in resisting Western imperialism, became a bystander.
More striking still, Gulf monarchies—particularly the UAE and Bahrain—voiced tacit or explicit support for Israel’s right to self-defense, a reversal of previous regional alignments. Even Saudi Arabia maintained strategic ambiguity. As reported by The National and Brookings, the new Middle Eastern consensus is one of pragmatic alignment with Israeli military supremacy and American security guarantees—not pan-Islamic solidarity or anti-Western resistance.
In this emerging geometry of power, Iran lacks the coalitionary gravity Ukraine has cultivated. Kyiv, though battered, enjoys security guarantees, intelligence sharing, and vast material support from the United States, the EU, the UK, Canada, Japan, and Australia. Iran, by contrast, is tied to a Kremlin that will not lift a finger without direct transactional benefit.
The Consequences for Moscow
Russia’s inaction in defense of Iran is not just a diplomatic slight—it is a strategic liability. By allowing its principal military supplier in the Middle East to suffer repeated attacks without response, Moscow signals weakness not only to Tehran, but to its entire network of quasi-clients: Syria, Venezuela, Armenia, and others. It reveals the limits of Russia’s reach in the Global South and exposes the hollow rhetoric of “strategic partnerships” often parroted in Russian state media.
Domestically, the Kremlin faces a war of attrition in Ukraine and is increasingly reliant on Iranian Shahed drones and short-range ballistic missiles. Should instability in Iran—caused by military escalation, domestic unrest, or economic collapse—disrupt this supply chain, Russia’s battlefield position in Ukraine would be gravely compromised. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Russia’s drone stockpile is already depleting faster than it can be replenished.
Even more troubling for Moscow is its lack of maneuverability in the Persian Gulf. Unlike in Syria, where Russia once exercised relative freedom, today’s regional balance leaves it boxed in. Israel enjoys U.S. cover, and Gulf monarchies increasingly share Israeli security interests. Any Russian attempt to reassert itself would risk confrontation with a U.S.-backed coalition far beyond its current capacities.
Conclusion: The End of Illusions
Israel’s strikes may have targeted Iranian infrastructure, but they inflicted far deeper damage on Russia’s geopolitical credibility. By failing to act, Putin has revealed the limits of his foreign policy toolkit and the exhaustion of Russia’s strategic capital. Tehran expected support, or at least rhetorical defiance. It got neither.
Far from forging a multipolar order, Moscow now stands exposed as a regional actor overextended and undercommitted. The myth of a rising anti-Western alliance—anchored by Russia, Iran, and China—has fractured on the rocks of Middle Eastern realism. In the eyes of Iran’s leadership, the Kremlin is no longer a partner. It is a liability.
As Ukraine continues to rally democratic allies and Iran drifts into isolation, the contrast could not be clearer. Russia has become what it always feared: a secondary power, abandoned in decisive moments—not by its enemies, but by its supposed friends.
References
Al Jazeera, Iran blames Israel for attack on Isfahan military site, April 2024
Reuters, Israel continues airstrikes on Iranian assets in Syria, May 2024
Xinhua News, China calls for calm in Middle East crisis, April 2024
UNSC Reports, 2022–2024
The National (UAE), Gulf states back Israel’s right to defend itself, May 2024
Brookings Institution, Iran’s regional isolation and implications, June 2024
Institute for the Study of War, Russia’s dependency on Iranian drones, January 2025
If you’d like, I can create a layout-ready version for Medium or Substack, or prepare a PDF/print adaptation.
Links: source