26 March, 19:41
Some crimes hide in the dark. Others hide in documents. The second kind is far more dangerous — because they come with a legal address, a bank account, and a tax return.
In March 2026, the South Korean human rights organization Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights published an investigation that documents what diplomats preferred to bury in footnotes: a legalized human trafficking system operating between Russia and North Korea. Not shadowy. Not criminal in the conventional sense. Legalized — through a college, through a bank, through an intergovernmental commission. The report was prepared with the participation of analysts from Transparency International — Russia and TriTrace Investigations managing partner Ilya Shumanov. It reads less like a diplomatic report and more like a verdict.
The Scheme: A Simplicity That Stuns
The algorithm, refined over several years, works as follows. A North Korean citizen enters Russia on a student visa. He is “enrolled” at a small Moscow college called Sodeistvie. He then goes to a construction site, a meat processing plant, a garment factory — working six days a week, eleven hours a day. The education that justifies his stay in the country is, in the words of the intermediaries themselves, “a formality.”
TriTrace Investigations founder Ilya Shumanov and analysts from Transparency International — Russia contacted the organization posing as representatives of a company looking to hire North Korean workers. Sergey Tkachuk, head of the intermediary Interstate Migratory Center, laid out the conditions in detail. Minimum order: one hundred people. Company age: at least three years. No outstanding tax debts.
Bank data reviewed by the investigative team shows that between October 2023 and June 2025, the college disbursed over 2.7 billion rubles (approximately $30 million) in “scholarships,” funded by at least 76 Russian enterprises. Bank documents explicitly name North Korean citizens as the recipients of payments.
That these are not scholarships is confirmed by the scale: Sodeistvie “students” receive between 18,000 and 250,000 rubles per month — up to 66 times the average academic scholarship at Russian higher education institutions in 2024, which stood at 3,801 rubles.
The money never reaches the workers themselves. The bulk of wages is handed over to North Korean state representatives, and these funds go toward financing North Korea’s military programs.
Who Is Behind It
The key financial link in the scheme is a private institution called Bank Agora. Its principal shareholder is Olga Averyanova, who inherited her stake in 2022 from her father, Yury Averyanov — an assistant to Dmitry Medvedev, chairman of the United Russia party. From 2013 to 2023, Averyanov served as First Deputy Secretary of the Security Council under Nikolai Patrushev, overseeing matters related to Siberia and the Far East. The geography is not coincidental.
The founder of Sodeistvie College, Alexander Panfilov, is subject to South Korean sanctions for illegally facilitating the entry and stay of North Korean workers in Russia.
Who Pays
Among the 76 enterprises financing the “scholarships” are major players in the federal market. The Cherkizovsky Meat Processing Plant — a subsidiary of Russia’s largest meat producer, Cherkizovo PJSC — hired at least 22 North Korean workers in early 2025; transfers to the college between January and June 2025 exceeded 10 million rubles. It is worth noting that Cherkizovo Group entered into a joint venture with Spain’s Grupo Fuertes in 2012.
Osko Product LLC — one of Russia’s largest hosiery manufacturers under the Allure brand — is also linked to North Korean labor. The company was founded by brothers Alyas and Dmitry Gvazava, business partners of Russia’s Deputy Minister of Defense Alexey Krivoruchko. According to payment records, the company hired 27 North Korean workers in early 2025.
Other names on the list include Velikiye Luki Meat Processing Plant, Pik-Tekhotdelka (a subsidiary of Russia’s second-largest developer), Etalonotdelka (Etalon Group), and the construction firm Integratsiya, which carries out government-contracted school renovations in the Moscow region.
Who Comes to “Study”
According to the investigation, North Korean military personnel are formally enrolled at institutions such as Far Eastern Federal University. They occupy university dormitories without attending any classes. Testimonies confirm they received no wages and were subjected to conditions including up to 20 hours of unpaid labor per day.
Before departure, they are specially prepared: briefed on behavior and tradecraft — including instructions not to salute North Korean military officers or security personnel they might encounter. The bulk of what they earn goes to the state. What remains covers food and a bed.
The Legal Architecture of a Crime
What is happening constitutes a direct violation of UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2375 (2017), which introduced a comprehensive ban on new joint ventures with North Korean entities and prohibited member states from issuing work authorizations to DPRK nationals. The resolution required all member states to repatriate North Korean overseas workers by December 2019.
Russia voted for that resolution.
Moscow’s response to the repatriation deadline was not closure — it was rebranding. Standard work visas were replaced with student and training visas. The same person was re-documented and sent back to the same construction site.
In 2024, Russia vetoed the renewal of the UN Panel of Experts — the body responsible for investigating violations of DPRK sanctions. The panel was dissolved.
Where the Money Goes
The investigation traces where the funds flow inside North Korea. They feed into companies tied to structures responsible for the nuclear program: the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau; Department 93, responsible for uranium enrichment, the nuclear and ballistic missile program including the Punggye-ri test site, and weapons and ammunition exports.
The circuit is closed. A Russian meat plant pays a “scholarship” through a Moscow college. The money passes through a bank whose key shareholder is the daughter of Medvedev’s aide. From there — through North Korea — to a nuclear test site.
What Is Missing
The investigation identifies a fundamental gap: not one of the companies involved in supplying North Korean forced labor has been sanctioned specifically for that role. Certain individuals have faced sanctions in connection with the war against Ukraine — but not for human trafficking, and not for nuclear financing. The 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau and Department 93 remain off the sanctions lists for their role in the forced labor that funds the ballistic and nuclear program.
LLC Kvanbok network diagram
An organizational map from a report on financing repression and weapons supply through Russia–North Korea joint ventures. The chart exposes a web of shell companies — stretching from Tver to Moscow and Ryazan — through which Pyongyang-linked agents, including Pak Gvan Sen and Pak Chan Bok, controlled legal entities alongside Russian partners. The central node is LLC Kvanbok (Yaroslavl, est. 2016, still active), connected to the veterans’ organization “Law and Order” and the NGO “Another Life.” Orange stars mark structures still in operation. Source: “Financing Oppression and Weapons Program: Russia–North Korea Joint Venture Through Military and Security Forces.”
North Korea’s power structure
An organizational chart of North Korea’s chain of command under Kim Jong-un, who simultaneously holds five key positions: General Secretary of the Workers’ Party, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, President of the State Affairs Commission, and Member of the Presidium of the Politburo. The system branches into party structures (the 2nd Economic Committee, the Munitions Industry Department, Bureau 39), security and military bodies (the KPA, the Ministry of Public Security), and construction and industrial units — most notably the External Construction Guidance Bureau and its subsidiaries Genco, Rungra, and Chinson. The latter serve as instruments for earning hard currency through the export of forced labor, including to Russia.
Image 3–9th CC of WPK, elected February 22, 2026
The current configuration of North Korea’s top leadership following the election of the 9th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The chart maps the intersection of three institutions — the Politburo, the Central Military Commission, and the State Affairs Commission — across six key figures. Pak Jong-chon heads the Military Government Guidance Department and serves as Vice Chairman of the CMC; Jo Chun-ryong directs the Munitions Industry Department; Jo Yong-won — the most influential apparatchik — runs the Organization and Guidance Department. Compiled from data provided by the North Korea Information Portal of South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, accessed February 23, 2026.