Trump Didn’t Stop Putin in Ukraine. Why Should Denmark Trust Him?

18 January, 19:23
President Trump's declaration that the United States must annex Greenland presents a curious case study in contemporary geopolitics. According to the American leader's logic, Washington must absorb this Danish autonomous territory to prevent its capture by Russia. This rationale demands careful examination—primarily because it exposes fundamental contradictions in the current administration's strategic thinking.

The rhetorical structure of Trump's justification bears a striking resemblance to Putin's logic circa 2014. Back then, the Kremlin defended its annexation of Crimea as necessary to preempt NATO, which was allegedly preparing an invasion of the peninsula. Preemptive seizure of foreign territory to protect against a hypothetical threat—this formula works equally well in Washington and Moscow. The difference lies only in the narrative details, not in its essence.

Here emerges the first anomaly. If Russia has demonstrated a willingness to ignore any international guarantees and agreements—including the Budapest Memorandum, under which three NATO countries pledged to ensure Ukraine's territorial integrity—then how exactly should American annexation of Greenland stop potential Russian aggression? Putin violated this memorandum in 2014 when he seized Crimea. NATO did not intervene. He repeated this in 2022 by launching a full-scale invasion. NATO again did not intervene directly.

Indeed, the Ukrainian precedent demolishes Trump's logic. Moscow has proven that it is deterred neither by a country's formal membership in Western security structures, nor by international treaties, nor even by the threat of sanctions. Russian troops entered a country whose security was guaranteed by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia itself. What exactly in this picture should convince Denmark that American control over Greenland would create more reliable protection from Russia than Danish sovereignty under NATO's umbrella?

Here manifests the second anomaly. Trump came to power promising to immediately stop Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Time has passed—the war Moscow unleashed continues. Moreover, the American administration's actions in blocking military aid to Ukraine have inflicted serious damage on the country's defensive capabilities. And yet Ukraine stands. Meanwhile, Putin demonstratively ignores any negotiation initiatives from Trump, continuing his offensive and advancing demands that are obviously unacceptable.

This situation formulates the central question: if the Russian president so clearly disregards Trump's position even on the war that the American leader declared a priority of his foreign policy, then on what basis should Denmark believe Trump is capable of protecting Greenland from that same Russia? The logic collapses upon first contact with reality.

Putin does not fear NATO—he has proven this. He does not fear the United States—he has proven this too. He does not reckon with Trump—this becomes more obvious with each passing day of war. Under these conditions, the proposal to transfer Greenland under American control for protection from Russia looks not like a security strategy but like geopolitical absurdity. Trump asks Denmark to believe in his ability to contain Moscow at the very moment when Moscow publicly demonstrates complete indifference to his influence.

Perhaps this is precisely where the main lesson of the Greenland episode lies. It shows how rhetoric of strength is divorced from the actual ability to apply it. Annexation does not equal protection. Threats do not equal deterrence. And loud declarations about the necessity of preemptive action do not compensate for the absence of a well-considered strategy. Copenhagen understands this. The question remains—does Washington?