Witkoffgate: How Moscow Wrote the Peace Plan for the White House

Bloomberg published transcripts of two phone conversations that may become the largest intelligence scandal in the history of the Trump administration. At the center of events is Steven Witkoff, President Trump’s Special Envoy for the Middle East, and Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s aide for international affairs — effectively the second-ranking figure in the Kremlin after the Russian president himself.

The intercepted conversations demonstrate something unprecedented: not merely coordination of positions, not diplomatic consultations, but direct guidance from Moscow of an American official’s actions working against the interests of the United States’ geopolitical ally — Ukraine.

Conversation One: “We’ll Do It Neatly”

October 29, 2025. Yuri Ushakov is speaking with Kirill Dmitriev, head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and the Kremlin’s longtime liaison with Western elites. Dmitriev is in Saudi Arabia and proposes passing the Russian draft peace plan on Ukraine to Witkoff.

The scheme is simple and cynical: Moscow prepares a document with its demands, Dmitriev passes it to Witkoff “informally,” and the American special envoy should present the plan as his own.

Key fragment of the dialogue:

Dmitriev: “I think, this paper, we’ll just make it as if in our position and I’ll just pass it informally, directly saying that all this is informal. And let them make it as their own.”

Ushakov: “Well, that’s just it — they might not take it, but say it was agreed with us. That’s what I’m afraid of.”

Dmitriev: “No, no, no. For sure I’ll… well, directly with you, exactly word for word as you say, I’ll say it.”

Dmitriev: “Yes, I think just like that… And then you can also talk with Steve about this paper. That is, we’ll do it neatly.”

Ushakov fears that Witkoff will change the text and Russian demands will be distorted. Dmitriev reassures him: everything will be transmitted “word for word” and done “neatly.” This is essentially the briefing of an agent of influence.

Most astonishing: Witkoff indeed didn’t even try to properly translate the text. The Guardian, conducting a linguistic analysis of the published “Witkoff plan,” discovered multiple Russianisms and excessive use of passive voice — a construction atypical for American political English. The document was simply run through an automatic translator.

Conversation Two: Instructions on Manipulating the President

October 14, 2025, two days before Trump’s phone conversation with Putin. Witkoff calls Ushakov and essentially conducts a briefing on how to properly work with the American president.

The conversation begins with congratulations. Ushakov thanks Witkoff for “excellent work” on Gaza, mentions that Russia even postponed the Russian-Arab Summit so as not to interfere with Witkoff’s efforts in the region. This is an important detail: it shows that an established coordination channel exists between Moscow and Witkoff.

Then the most interesting part begins. Ushakov asks for advice: should they organize a phone conversation between the “bosses”?

Witkoff: “Yeah, I think so.”

Ushakov: “And when do you think this could be arranged?”

Witkoff: “I think as soon as you suggest it, my boss will be ready.”

Witkoff then proceeds to detailed recommendations:

Witkoff: “Yuri, Yuri, here’s what I would do. My recommendation. I would call just to remind that you’re congratulating the president on this achievement, that you supported him, that you respect him as a man of peace and that you’re pleased with the results of his work.”

Witkoff explains Trump’s psychology to Ushakov, teaches him how to properly flatter the American president. He literally gives a master class on manipulating his own boss.

Witkoff: “Let me tell you what I told the president. I told the president that you… that the Russian Federation has always wanted a peace agreement. I believe this.”

Then Witkoff proposes creating a “20-point peace plan” analogous to the Gaza plan. And immediately lets slip the essence of the deal:

Witkoff: “Between us, I understand what’s needed to make peace: Donetsk and possibly exchange of some other territories.”

The U.S. special envoy is essentially acknowledging Russian annexation of Donetsk Oblast and is prepared to discuss further exchange of Ukrainian territories. Without Ukraine’s participation, naturally.

Sabotaging the Ukrainian Agenda

The key moment of the conversation concerns Zelensky’s visit to the White House, scheduled for October 17:

Witkoff: “And one more thing: Zelensky will be at the White House on Friday.”

Ushakov: “I know.” [chuckles]

Witkoff: “I’m going to that meeting because they want me there, but I think, if possible, it would be good to arrange a call with your boss before that meeting.”

Ushakov: “Before, before — yes?”

Witkoff: “Right.”

This is an extremely important fragment. Witkoff directly recommends that Ushakov organize a Trump-Putin conversation before the meeting with Zelensky. The goal is obvious: to “override” the Ukrainian agenda, to turn Trump against Ukraine before the visit of its president.

The chronology of events confirms the effectiveness of this scheme:

• October 14 — Witkoff-Ushakov conversation discussing the need for a Trump-Putin call before Zelensky’s visit
• October 16 — Trump’s phone conversation with Putin took place
• October 17 — instead of the promised Tomahawk missiles for Ukraine, Trump subjected Zelensky to a “roasting”: shouting, cursing, throwing maps on the table

According to media reports, after the conversation with Putin, Trump sharply changed his attitude toward Ukraine and canceled the transfer of long-range cruise missiles. At the October 17 meeting, the U.S. president behaved aggressively toward Zelensky, effectively demanding territorial concessions.

Witkoff didn’t just coordinate positions — he actively sabotaged the Ukrainian agenda and disrupted the delivery of critically important weapons.

Beyond “Watergate”

To understand the scale of the scandal, historical parallels must be drawn.

“Watergate” (1972–1974) led to President Nixon’s resignation but concerned a domestic political matter — an attempt to wiretap Democratic Party headquarters and subsequent cover-up of the crime.

“Iran-Contra” (1985–1987) in the Reagan administration involved secret arms sales to Iran and illegal financing of Nicaraguan rebels. The scandal seriously undermined trust in the president but didn’t lead to impeachment.

“Signalgate” (March 2025) — the scandal with National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who prematurely disclosed information about strikes on Houthis. This was official negligence, a matter of incompetence.

“Witkoffgate” is on an entirely different level. This is not internal political struggle and not negligence. This is direct betrayal of U.S. national interests — collusion with a geopolitical adversary against a geopolitical ally.

The closest historical analogy is the Kim Philby case, head of MI6’s Section IX (counterintelligence against the USSR), who worked for the KGB for decades. Philby’s exposure in 1963 became British intelligence’s biggest failure during the Cold War.

In Witkoff’s case, the scale may be even more serious: if Philby transmitted information, Witkoff actively implemented Russian interests using the powers of a U.S. presidential special envoy.

Under U.S. law, Witkoff’s actions fall under the definition of treason or at minimum espionage and working for a foreign power without registering as a foreign agent (FARA violations).

Intelligence Breakthrough

Bloomberg’s publication of the wiretaps raises a fundamental question: how did Western intelligence services manage to wiretap Yuri Ushakov — the second-ranking figure in Russia’s power hierarchy?

Ushakov is not an ordinary official. He is the Russian president’s aide for international affairs, a person with access to the most secret information, including Putin’s direct orders. His phone conversations should be protected at the highest level.

Possible scenarios:

1. Wiretap on Witkoff’s or Dmitriev’s side — the most likely scenario. American or allied intelligence services could have monitored the phones of Witkoff (as a U.S. official) or Dmitriev (who is frequently in Western jurisdiction).
2. Compromise of Russian communication channels — less likely but technically possible. This would represent a major breakthrough in Russia’s secure communications system.
3. Insider in Ushakov’s circle — theoretically possible but unlikely given the paranoia level of Russian intelligence services.
4. Deliberate leak from Russian sources — very unlikely, as the publication compromises a Russian channel of influence.

The question of which intelligence service exactly conducted the operation and passed the materials to Bloomberg remains open.

This leak is extremely disadvantageous for Moscow — it essentially exposes an agent of influence in Trump’s circle. Washington also finds the publication disadvantageous at this stage — it could derail the negotiation process before its key phase.

Some observers, including political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov, hint at a British trail. London has its own interests in the conflict and may seek to prevent a separate U.S.-Russia deal behind the backs of European allies. British intelligence MI6 traditionally has powerful capabilities for technical communications monitoring (GCHQ) and historical experience working against Russia.

However, this could also be an internal American operation — the work of the U.S. intelligence community against Trump’s political appointees, who are perceived as a threat to national security.

Where is Russia’s Foreign Ministry?

Another important aspect of the scandal is the complete absence of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the negotiation process.

The intercepted conversations demonstrate that key foreign policy issues are being discussed by:

• Yuri Ushakov (presidential aide)
• Kirill Dmitriev (investment fund head, formally unrelated to diplomacy)
• Steven Witkoff (U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East, also formally not dealing with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict)

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, traditionally occupying a central place in Russian diplomacy, has been completely removed from the process.

Political scientist Abbas Galyamov draws attention to this detail: Lavrov’s diminished role may indicate several factors:

1. Putin doesn’t trust the Foreign Ministry with such secret negotiations and conducts them through personal aides and informal emissaries.
2. Lavrov may not share the Kremlin’s current line on Ukraine and is therefore removed from the real decision-making process.
3. The shift to “shadow diplomacy” through businessmen and informal intermediaries is a sign that official channels aren’t working or are deliberately being blocked.

Using Dmitriev — an investment fund head — as a key negotiating figure shows that the Kremlin is building a parallel structure of foreign policy contacts, bypassing traditional diplomatic institutions.

Trump’s Reaction: Misunderstanding the Scale

Trump’s initial reaction to the Bloomberg publication showed that the U.S. president has not yet grasped the full depth of the problem.

When asked by a journalist about the wiretaps, Trump responded:

“No, I haven’t heard, but it’s a standard thing because he has to sell [Ukraine’s ideas] to Russia. That’s what a negotiator does. He has to say: look, they want this, and you have to convince them of that — it’s quite a standard form of negotiation.”

Trump perceived the situation as ordinary diplomatic work by a mediator who conveys the positions of parties to each other. But the transcripts show something completely different:

• Witkoff is not “selling Ukraine’s ideas to Russia” — he’s coordinating Russian strategy for pressuring Ukraine
• He’s not “mediating” — he’s receiving instructions from Moscow
• He’s not “convincing parties” — he’s sabotaging weapons deliveries to Ukraine

When asked if he’s concerned that Witkoff is too pro-Russian, Trump answered:

“No, I think… look, this war could go on for years, and Russia has far more people and far more soldiers. So I think if Ukraine can make a deal, that’s a good thing.”

This logic is a direct reflection of the Russian narrative being transmitted to him through Witkoff. Trump is reproducing Kremlin arguments about the “inevitability” of Ukraine’s defeat due to Russia’s numerical superiority.

What Rank Does Witkoff Hold?

Formally, Steven Witkoff is the U.S. President’s Special Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa. This is not a cabinet-level position, but the status of “presidential special representative” gives him direct access to Trump and certain powers in international negotiations.

After the publication of the transcripts, his real “rank” can be defined differently:

• Agent of influence for the Kremlin in the U.S. administration (based on functions actually performed)
• Unregistered foreign agent (under U.S. FARA legislation)
• Traitor (if conscious harm to national security is proven)

The question remains open: will Trump throw Witkoff “overboard from the White House as ballast”?

On one hand, the scale of the scandal demands sacrifices — Witkoff becomes a toxic figure, his continued presence in the administration will be a constant irritant for Congress and the intelligence community.

On the other hand, Trump is known for his loyalty to people in his inner circle and tendency to ignore criticism. Moreover, Witkoff’s resignation would mean acknowledging the problem and could trigger congressional investigations.

Most likely, the decision will depend on the reaction of Republicans in Congress — if key senators demand resignation, Trump will be forced to comply.

Seven Questions Following the Publication of Wiretaps

1. Bloomberg published transcripts of two phone conversations. Yuri Ushakov participates in both. His phone is being wiretapped. By whom?

Exactly unknown. Most likely — the U.S. NSA or British GCHQ, possibly within the “Five Eyes” program (intelligence alliance of the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). Alternative version — the wiretap wasn’t directly of Ushakov, but of his interlocutors: Witkoff (as a U.S. official) or Dmitriev (who is regularly in Western jurisdiction).

2. Documents of the U.S. administration, including Trump’s Plan, are being prepared in the Kremlin, now this is known in the U.S. as well. Andrei Nikulin writes that this is a “new Watergate.” Absolutely correct. Will Trump throw Witkoff overboard from the White House as ballast?

This exceeds “Watergate” in scale — there it was internal political struggle, here it’s collusion with a geopolitical adversary. Witkoff’s fate depends on pressure from Congress and the Republican elite. If senators demand his resignation and investigation, Trump will be forced to sacrifice Witkoff. If not — the president may try to ride out the scandal, which will only strengthen suspicions of Russian influence on the administration.

3. Who organized the leak of wiretaps to Bloomberg? This isn’t advantageous for Moscow — the wiretaps essentially expose their agent. Not for Washington either — discussion of the peace plan could be disrupted before the key phase of negotiations. Vladimir Pastukhov hints at one interested party — London. Which intelligence service passed the wiretaps to the media?

Three main versions: (1) British intelligence, interested in disrupting a separate U.S.-Russia deal behind the backs of European allies; (2) The American intelligence community, working against Trump’s political appointees; (3) Trump’s domestic political opponents in the U.S. who received materials from intelligence. The London version looks convincing — MI6/GCHQ has technical capabilities, motivation, and a tradition of such operations. However, this could also be interagency struggle in the U.S. between the intelligence community and the White House.

4. Negotiations on the Kremlin’s side are being handled by Ushakov and Dmitriev. Abbas Galyamov draws attention to the declining role of Sergey Lavrov in developing the Kremlin’s strategy. Where is the Foreign Ministry?

The Foreign Ministry has been completely removed from the real process. Putin is using a parallel structure: a personal aide (Ushakov) and an informal business emissary (Dmitriev). This may mean: (a) distrust of the Foreign Ministry in such secret negotiations; (b) Lavrov’s disagreement with the current line; © shift to “shadow diplomacy” as a sign of non-functioning official channels. The fact that the head of an investment fund, not a diplomat, plays a key role demonstrates the degradation of Russia’s foreign policy system.

5. What rank does Steven Witkoff hold?

Formally — U.S. President’s Special Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa. Actually, based on the results of his actions: Kremlin agent of influence, unregistered foreign agent (under FARA legislation), potentially — traitor. His real “rank” will be determined by federal investigation, if one occurs.

6. Who’s next?

If Witkoff is forced to resign, this won’t solve the systemic problem. The question is how many more such channels of Russian influence exist in the Trump administration? How deep is the penetration? Who else in the president’s circle is receiving “instructions” from Moscow? This scandal may be just the tip of the iceberg.

7. Why is Trump defending Witkoff?

Two possible explanations: (a) the president doesn’t understand the scale of the problem and perceives the situation as ordinary diplomatic work; (b) Witkoff’s resignation will destroy the entire constructed scheme of negotiations with Russia and call into question the legitimacy of “Trump’s plan.” A third explanation is also possible — Trump himself shares the position that Witkoff transmits and doesn’t consider coordination with Moscow something reprehensible. This is the most dangerous option for American national security.

“Witkoffgate” is only just beginning. Bloomberg’s transcripts are the opening salvo that opens the road for congressional investigations, possible criminal cases, and fundamental revision of the negotiation process on Ukraine.

The question now is not whether there was collusion with Russia. The question is how deep it went and how many people in the U.S. administration are working in Moscow’s interests.